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Within the context of discussions regarding the
Constitution and its forming, great emphasis is given to the
history of the ideas which influenced and/or became a part of
that document.

The general term given to the line of thought of

which our Constitution is a part is "natural law" theory,
referring to the rights which the founding fathers, or natural
law theorists in general, deemed so basic as to be understood.
Such a doctrine manifests as the "inalienable rights ... life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness"

in the Declaration of

Independence, but in a more subdued and practical manner in our
Constitution.

In discussions of this school of thought, three

important works by three major European political philosophers
are often the center of the conversation.

Jean Jacque Rousseau's

Social Contract, The Spirit of Laws by Charles Louis de Secondat
Montesquieu, and John Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government
provide excellent insight into the school of natural law thought.
On the surface, it would appear that all three played a major
role in the development of American natural law thought and thus
on the formation of the Constitution.

In fact, two of the three

can be shown to be such an influence.

Rousseau, however, is

conspicuously absent both in the interaction of the Constitution
writers and in the form of the Constitution itself.
In order to better understand the role of the three
philosophers in the formation of the Constitution, we will look
1

2

at the major works of each, outlining the theories presented.
Following that discussion, an exploration of the importance of
each of the individuals through the private notes and
correspondences of the founders will help to determine the
relative prestige each of the theoreticians held within the
American intellectual community.

With that in mind, the last

section will outline the specific points drawn from the
philosophical works into the text of the Constitution.
Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government is not
long.

In fact, Jefferson refers to it as, "Locke's little book

on Government." 1

However, it contains a thorough discussion of

the basis of government, its relationship to society and
individuals, and the source of government's power.

"The true

original, extent, and end of civil government; as understood by
Locke.

11 2

Locke begins his discussion of government by explaining
what he believes to be the "state of nature," explained as:
"perfect freedom [of men] to order their actions, and dispose of
their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending

1

Thomas Jefferson, New York, to Thomas Mann Randolph Jr., 30
May 1790, in Julian P. Boyd ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson
vol. XVI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 449.
2

Richard Ashcraft, Locke's Two Treatises of Government
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1987), 4.

3

upon the will of any other man.

113

In this state all are equal

and have the same rights, which he limits only by disallowing
infringement on other's liberty or property and by disallowing
the right of people to destroy themselves (which later becomes
necessary to the consistency of his theory).

In Locke's state of

nature, man has only one power over another, which Locke
describes in Chapter two: "Each transgression (which he has
defined as an infringement on another's liberty or property} may
be punished to that degree, and with so much severity, as will
suffice to make it an ill bargain to the offender, give him cause
to repent, and terrify other from doing the like." 4

Retribution

and punishment--the natural power of one over another in this
natural state is limited to punishment.
Thus man has the natural power to preserve life,
liberty, and estate from others.

However, Locke maintained that

in some cases, personal power would be inadequate protection.
is for this reason that governments are formed.

It

To bring this

about, people enter into a contract with society which dictates
that the burden of that protection fall upon society, in return
for which the individual forfeits personal rights to act in
retribution or punishment as described above.

The right

replacing the right to act is that of appeal to the government
3

John Locke, On Politics and Education with introduction by
Howard R. Penniman.
Second Treatise on civil Government (Roslyn,
NY: Walter J. Black, Inc., 1947), Ch. II, Section 4.
4

Locke, Ch. II Section 12.

4

for protection.

This is the genesis of civil government as Locke

described it.
In the government Locke described, every citizen is
obligated "to submit to the determination of the majority. 115
Unanimity to Locke was an impossibility to a working government.
Our own experience with the Articles of Confederation serves as a
working model to support that idea.

To Locke, the citizen is

obligated to submit to them majority unless that majority
threatens the life, liberty or property which protection is its
reason for existence.

In such a case the contract would be

broken by the society, not the individual, and thus the contract
would be void.
The ideas outlined in Rousseau's Social Contract also
fall under the rubric of natural law thinking.

However, very

little of his thought regarding government can be classified as
original.

In fact, upon analysis, it can be seen that a great

many of his ideas are very similar to those of Locke nearly 100
years earlier, and Rousseau's thoughts are more theory and less
detail than those of either Locke or Montesquieu.
The very basis of Rousseau's thought is also the title
of his major work.

In his plan for ideal government a social

contract would be established whereby each individual would give
up his (at this time only males were included} rights for the
good of the whole.

5

He writes, "Each of us places in common his

Locke, Ch. VIII, Section 97.

5

person and all his power under the supreme direction of hte
general will; and as one body we all receive each member as an
indivisible part of the whole.

116

Important in this theory is

again the idea of a basic state of nature, which existed before
and is thus superior to society.

In this state of nature,

Rousseau explains, each individual has the right to defend
himself from the encroachments of others, and to generally follow
his own laws.

It is because of the weakness of one against

another more powerful that civil society is developed as
described above.

In this process, those natural rights which

existed in the state of nature are conceded to the whole in
return for civil rights which are granted to individuals by the
society. 7

The comparisons to Locke are obvious after reading

this description of his ideas.
The similarities between Locke and Rousseau continue in
the plan of government vaguely outlined in the Social Contract.
Rousseau states that in order to achieve a goal, two things are
required: a) the will to acquire, and b) the power to execute
that will.

For instance, in order for me to walk across a room,

first I must want to walk across the room, and secondly I must
have the skeletal muscle and motor coordination to physically
move my body by taking steps.
two parts.

Similarly, governments must have

The first, the legislative, must be the will of

society--it must make decisions.
6

Jean Jacque Rousseau.

7

Rousseau, 14

The second part, the executive,

The Social Contract.

15.

6

must carry out the will of the society by physically enforcing
the rules passed by the legislative.

In contrast to Locke,

Rousseau felt that the executive should be appointed by the
legislative and be answerable to the legislative--no separation
of powers. 8

Neverthe_l ess, it is plain to see how much of

Rousseau's thinking is a parallel of the Second Treatise.

This

appears to be the crucial factor regarding the Constitution
writers seemingly ignoring him.
While Rousseau may be accused of unoriginality, the
same may be said for many writers on this subject, including
Montesquieu.

However, whereas Rousseau is vague and highly

theoretical in most of his thought, Montesquieu, in Spirit of
Laws establishes an extremely specific and practical guide for
the establishment of government.

Additionally, Montesquieu

includes three different viable systems of government in his
work, comparing the various aspects of republicanism, despotism,
and monarchy.

While the document as a whole is fascinating, it

is the portions which discuss republican government which pertain
to this study.
Montesquieu defines republican government as, "that in
which the body or only a part of the people is posessed of the
supreme power." 9

He suggests that in democracy, the people are

at once the sovereign, which he defines as that body with

8

Rousseau, 50-51.

9

Charles Louis de Secondat Montesquieu. The Spirit of Laws.
(Berkeley: University of California Pre~s, 1977), Book II, Ch. 1.

7

absolute power, and subject to that sovereign at the same time.
In this system, decisions and laws must be made and executed.

In

order to carry out such actions, which is truly the function of
government, a democracy may be required to choose what
Montesquieu called magistrates, or people qualified to be
representatives.

From this a republic evolves. 10

Montesquieu defined three types of governmental power
which were present in all governments, regardless of their
fundamental organization.

The first of these he called

legislative and defined as the power to enact laws.

Secondly,

executive (a) had the power to decide on peace or declare war,
direct other foreign affairs, and ensure public security for
society.

Executive (b) could punish crimes and settle disputes

between parties in society, what we would call judicial power.
In each type of government, these power structures would manifest
themselves differently.

In a republican form of government, "The

legislative power is therefore committed to the body of the
nobles, and to the body chosen to represent the people." 11
Montesquieu had previously endorsed a distinction by class in
society (not surprising since he was a baron himself), and this
statement reflects his belief in representing not only nobles as
was true in Europe at the time, but also the common people, who
should have a voice in government.

An executive and judicial

system are also accounted for in Spirit of Laws, but an important
'°Montesquieu, Book II, Ch. 2.
11

Montesquieu, Book XI, Ch. 6.

8

aspect of defining these three types of power is that, in a
republic, Montesquieu believed they should all be separate,
echoing Locke.

In this way, the people wouldn't have to fear a

tyranny or a usurpation of liberty . 12

So we can see that

Montesquieu was indeed similar to Locke and Rousseau in his
thoughts, although his arguments depend less on natural rights
than the other two.

What cannot be seen from this broad outline,

but will borne apparent later, is the detail and practicality
which made this particular essay so important in the formation of
the Constitution.
Locke, Rousseau, and Montesquieu were discussing much
of the same material.

Government based on the power of the

people from natural law.

It can be seen that many of the United

States' great leaders of the time were enmeshed with this
thinking as well.

By studying them we can gain a picture of just

how influencial these three specific thinkers were to the
formation of the thought of the founders.
It is obvious from the correspondence of the American
leaders that Locke's work, as well as that of Montesquieu, was
considered required reading for all those considering law or
politics as a career.

On one occasion, Thomas Jefferson writes

to a young man considering law as a career, giving him a list of
material which should be read.

12

Ibid.

Included on that list is "Locke

9

on Government," as well as Montesquieu. 13

What is perhaps most

interesting in perusing Jefferson's correspondence is that while
Montesquieu was indeed necessary reading, he was also considered
somewhat dangerous.
In a letter to Jefferson dated 14 April 1787, a young man
interested in political science named Thomas M. Randolph Jr.
tells Jefferson he has been reading such works as Montesquieu and
Hume.

Some time later, Jefferson sends advice back to the man

which basically approves of this choice, but displays
reservations as well.

Jefferson writes, "In the science of

government Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws is generally recommended.
It contains a great number of political truths; but almost an
equal number of political heresies: so that the reader must be
constantly on his guard." 14

Besides reading Locke and

Montesquieu, many of those others recommended by Jefferson are
themselves representative of especially Lockean thinking.

For

example, Blackstone is on the list to the would-be lawyer and
wrote,
the principal aim of society is to protect individuals, in the
enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them
by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be
preserved, in peace, without that mutual assistance, and
intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly
and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and
13

Thomas Jefferson, New York, to John G. Jefferson, 11 June
1790, in Julian P. Boyd ed., The Papers of Thomas Jefferson vol.
XVI (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950), 481.
14

Thomas Mann Randolph, Jr. letter to Thomas Jefferson 14
April 1787 and Thomas Jefferson, letter to Thomas Mann Randolph,
Jr. 30 May 1790, Boyd, Vols. XII, 442 and XVI, 449.

10

primary end of human laws, is to maintain and regulate these
absolute rights of individuals. 15
Evidence of Lockean thinking is also evident in the
documents of the day.

"The Declaration of Independence" is the

primary example of this as many of the lines included are almost
word for word from Locke's Second Treatise.
As monumental a figure as Thomas Jefferson was, he was
not directly involved in the main focus of this study, the
formation of the Constitution.

While it is plain Jefferson's

influence is important, the writing and defense of this document
was left to men such as James Madison and Alexander Hamilton.
Hamilton was not the stereotypical Lockean thinker, nor
was Montesquieu his primary basis of thought.

In fact, Clinton

Rossiter writes, "he may well be the most unclassifiable man of
pronounced views in all the history of American thought and
politics. 1116

Despite this, we can see that at the very least he

considered both Locke and Montesquieu to be necessary reading, much
as did Jefferson.

Not usually one to appeal to sources other than

reason, he does so in his essay, "A Farmer Refuted," suggesting, "I
would recommend for your perusal, Grotius, Puffendorf, Locke,
Montesquieu, and Burlemaqui."

Hamilton also cites Montesquieu

15

Blackstone Book I Chapter I, p. 124, quoted in Alexander
Hamilton, "A Farmer Refuted," in Harold C. Syrett ed., The Papers
of Alexander Hamilton vol. I (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1961), 88.
16

Clinton Rossiter, Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution
(New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964), 182.

11
several other times, including the speech outlining his plan for
government at the Constitutional Convention and in several of the
Federalist Papers. 17

While these examples show the influence of

Montesquieu, other early writings by Hamilton demonstrate a strong
Lockean influence.

Later writings indicate that he was influenced

to a great degree by Hobbes and especially Hume, although he seldom
acknowledges any sources of thought in his work.

However, Rossiter

explains that despite his tendency toward other writers, Hamilton
was essentially Lockean: "He, too, for all his leanings toward
Toryism, as an American Whig, and thus a willing prisoner of the
venerable line of natural law thinkers stretching from Cicero to
Locke.

1118

James Madison, who is sometimes called the "Father of the
Constitution," was obviously
and Jefferson.

1119

11

•••

a disciple of Locke, Montesquieu,

He is credited with the actual drafting of major

portions of the Constitution, and it can be seen that much of that
document comes directly from the Virginia Plan, of which Madison
was a primary author.

In that document, Madison writes that the

Articles of Confederation should be changed to accomplish the

17

Alexander Hamilton, "A Farmer Refuted," in Harold C. Syrett
ed., The Papers of Alexander Hamilton vol. 1 (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1961), 86. Also ''Speech to the Constitutional
Convention" and "The Federalist Papers," in Syrett, vol. IV, 185
and 234.
18

19

Rossiter, 121.

Edward McNall Burns, James Madison, Philosopher of the
Constitution, (New York: Octagon Books, Inc., 1968), 47.

12
objects of: "common defence, security of liberty, and general
welfare." 20

These tenets come directly from Locke.

In fact,

Edward Burns explains, "As a disciple of Locke he set up the
presumption, first of all, of liberty and property as natural
rights which the state, no matter what its organization, cannot
invade. " 21

Many of these ideas are also found in Montesquieu's

writing and it can be seen that while Locke's thinking was indeed
important, perhaps Montesquieu's practicility had an even greater
effect.

An editorial written by Madison for the National Gazette

in 1792 indicates his attitude toward both of these philosophers.
Montesquieu was in politics not a Newton or a Locke, who
established immortal systems, the one in matter, the other in
mind. He was in his particular science what Bacon was in
universal science: He lifted the veil from the venerable
errors which enslaved opinion, and pointed thw way to those
luminous truths of which he had but a glimpse himself. 22
Clearly, Madison, Hamilton, and Jefferson, were
influenced by the writings of Locke and Montesquieu.

What is

interesting is that despite the reputation he has gained through
scholarly discussions and histories of natural law thinking,
Rousseau is very seldom mentioned by any of these three early
American leaders.

Hamilton acknowledges Rousseau once in a speech

20 "The

Virginia Plan," Section I, published in Melvin I.
Urofsky ed. Documents of American Constitutional and Legal
History vol. I, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), 90-92.
21

22

Burns, 63.

James Madison, "Spirit of Governments." in David Mattern et
al eds., The Papers of James Madison.
(Charlottesville:
University Press of Virginia, 1991), vol. XIV, 233.

13

defining democracy, but the reference is in passing, as though
recognizing his thought on the subject, but not acknowledging any
special importance he may have. 23

The only mention either Madison

or Jefferson make of Rousseau is in correspondence to one another
regarding a visit the European philosopher made to Monticello.

It

seems from the letters that Rousseau did not much care for Virginia
or Jefferson's home.

The nature of this correspondence does not

lead one to believe that Rousseau's thinking was of major
importance to the two Virginians.

Indeed, Rousseau is conspicuous

by his absence from these papers and the conclusion we must draw is
that while he was obviously known, he was equally obviously of
little importance to the thoughts of these founders. 24
It can thus be seen that many of the major thinkers of
the time were either partially or wholly influenced by John Locke
and Charles Louis Montesquieu, and especially by the theories set
forth in The Second Treatise on Civil Government and The Spirit of
Laws including, but not only, the major writer of the Constitution,
James Madison, as well as the two major proponents of the
Constitution after its drafting, Madison and Alexander Hamilton.
What is fascinating is that this influence was not merely and
abstract bias which subtly pressured the Constitution in a certain
direction.

These documents were of primary guiding importance in

the structure of the new government.
As discussed above, the ideal government according to
n Hamilton, in Syrett, Vol. V, 150.
MBoyd, The Papers of Thomas Jefferson.

14

Locke was to be based on the contract between individuals and
society, and while Montesquieu does not make that explicit, he does
indicate that in a republic the people as a whole are sovereign,
holding total power.

The individual forfeits natural rights of

action which would be used to protect the rights of life, liberty,
and property.

In return, the government, with the cooperation of

society, protects those rights.

Individuals then gain secondary

rights, which are appeal to government for arbitration of
grievances, and retribution and punishment for transgressions
against that individual's rights.
Montesquieu call "civil."

It was these rights which

Therefore, according to Locke or

Montesquieu, government consists of making laws to protect the
rights of life, liberty, and property from other members of the
society or from an outside aggressor, enforcing those laws, and
adjudicating grievances between parties of the society.
This explanation of the goals and justification for the
existence of government is contained in the Preamble to the
Constitution.

To "establish justice, insure domestic Tranquility,

provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty.

1125

Establishment of justice and

insurance of domestic tranquility refer to the duty of government
to settle internal disputes of its members, including punishment
and retribution if necessary.

Provision for common defence and

promotion of general welfare establishes government's duty to

25

Constitution of the United States of America, Preamble.
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protect its citizens from outside force, and security of the
blessings of liberty makes explicit the responsibility of
government to protect life, liberty, and property.
Locke envisioned a government where supreme power lay in
the legislative body, to form "an established, settled, known law
by common consent." 26 Arising from that body, or perhaps elected
separately, he called for an executive to carry out the laws passed
by the legislative body, with "power to back and support the
sentence when right and to give it due execution.

11 27

Locke did

feel it necessary that the executive be from outside of the
legislative body to prevent one naturally corruptible person from
gathering too much power unto him/herself "whereby they may exempt
themselves from obedience to the laws they make, and suit the law,
both in its making and execution, to their own private
advantage.

11 3

Additionally, Locke provided for a judicial branch

of government, "in the state of Nature there wants a known and
indifferent judge, with authority to determine all differences
according to established law.

11 29

Montesquieu, as discussed before,

also believed that a republican government should divide the three

u Locke, Ch. IX, Section 124.
27

Locke, Ch. IX, Section 126.

3

Locke, Ch. XII, Section 144.

29

Locke, Ch. IX, Section 12 5.

16

types of power into separate branches.

He suggests, "When the

legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or
in the same body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty."
Further he writes, "Again, there is no liberty, if the power of
judging be not separated from the legislative and executive
powers." ~
This provides the model upon which our government was
developed.

Madison, Hamilton, and others wrote and then defended

the idea of three separate branches of government.

The

Constitution provides in Article I for a legislative body, namely
our Congress, in Article II for an executive branch headed by the
President, and in Article III for a judicial branch separate from
the other two and headed by the Supreme Court. 31
Locke wrote, " ... and all of this to be directed to no
other end but the peace, safety, and public good of the people."
And further, that the government can have no power or "right to
destroy, enslave, or designedly to impoverish the subjects." n
However, the original Constitution, despite claiming to be for the
purpose of ''securing the Bles~ings of Liberty" provided no method
for this security.

Madison was entirely aware of that situation

and with the help of others rectified it by adding the Bill of

3

°Montesquieu, Book XI, Ch.6.

31

Constitution of the United States of America, Articles I,
II, and III.
n Locke, Ch. IX, Section 131, Ch. XI, Section 135.

17

Rights as the first ten amendments to the Constitution.

In most

cases, the Constitution was ratified only with their inclusion.
These ten articles secure the personal liberties of speech,
religion, assembly, and petition of government for settlement of
grievances, rights which the original of the Constitution ignored.
Especially important to Locke was the right to control one's own
property.

He wrote, "the supreme power cannot take from any man

any part of his property without his own consent." "
important to Madison and the writers.

This became

The fifth amendment provides

that no person shall "be deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law." 34 This due process is in effect the
law made by the majority and applied evenly to all, which is how
Locke defines consent in a civil society.
Just as Locke emphasized specific ideas which were then
infused into the Constitution, many other parts of that document
are derived directly from Spirit of Laws.

For instance, in Book

IX, Montesquieu develops the idea that in order for a republican
government to work, i t must represent a small number of people and
land or else succomb to what he called ''internal imperfection."
Unfortunately, a small state would easily be overrun by its enemies
because of a lack of people and economic strength to defend itself.
His answer to this quandry was what he called a Confederate

" Locke, Ch. XI, Section 138.
34

Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment V.

18

Republic, in which a number of different smaller republics give up
some sovereignty to each other for their mutual protection and
well-being--in effect an extension of the social contract to
states. 35

Interestingly, our government follows that very plan.

Each individual state gives up some of its rights to the whole
(just how many of those rights was not determined until the Civil
War), in return for the benefits a large country can offer.
Other, more specific, ideas are also offered by
Montesquieu.

As discussed before, he believed that a democratic

government should choose qualified people to run the government and
thus become a republic.

He later discusses the need for those

representatives to be answerable to a specific set of people, so
that this representative should be chosen locally.

In this manner,

the people could keep the legislative power in their own hands (at
least in theory).

This is indeed what was established in the lower

house of Congress.

Article I Section I states, "The House of

Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second
Year by the People of the several States."

Montesquieu also

conceived of a bicameral legislature, with both an upper and a
lower chamber, such as provided in Article I of the Constitution. 36
Just as Locke, Montesquieu was also concerned about
individual's rights.

Particularly prevalent are ideas about the

rights of those accused of a crime.

35

3

He proposes that in republican

Montesquieu, Book IX, Ch. 1.

6Montesquieu, Book XI, Ch. 6; Constitution of the United
States of America, Article I, Section I.

19

government, those accused of a crime must face the decision of a
group of persons drawn from the body of the people in general, not
from the legislature, and that the accused should have the right to
dismiss jury members he or she believes prejudiced in the case.
Montesquieu also states that a person arrested should be taken to
answer for the crime "without delay.
provides for these suggestions.

11 37

Again, the Constituti on

The sixth amendment states, "the

accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an
impartial jury.

11 38

Neither Locke nor Montesquieu was physically present at
the Constitutional convention, nor was Rousseau.

However, it can

plainly be seen that while Rousseau had at best a minimal impact on
that body, Locke and Montesquieu both played a major part in the
formation of the Constitution.

Most of what they wrote was

theoretical rather than practical in nature, but much of their work
was directly applicable to the convention and its goals.

They did

outline the basis of governmental power, its responsibilities, and
even the three-branched model of government for the founders to
follow.

However, the details were left to the writers to develop

themselves.

"The Declaration of Independence" is as much theory

and rhetoric as is Locke's treatise, but the Constitution, the
phoenix from the ashes of the Articles of Confederation, was
necessarily much more.

Arthur

o.

Lovejoy, in his Reflections on

Human Nature, pays tribute to the writers:
37

Montesquieu, Book XI, Ch. 6.

38

Constitution of the United States of America, Amendment VI.

20

... well aware that their task ... was not to lay down
abstract principles of political philosophy, not to rest
the system they were constructing simply upon theorems
about the 'natural rights' of men or of the States,
though they postulated such rights. Their problem was
not chiefly one of political ethics but of practical
psychology, a need not so much to preach to American
about what they ought to do, as to predict what they
would do. 39
John Patrick Diggins, in his essay "Theory and the American
Founding", adds, •• ... they were realists who translated the data of
history into the problem of power and its control."~
Locke's Second Treatise on Civil Government is certainly
not perfect, nor was Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws.
theoretical rather than practical.

They WERE

Nevertheless, they were self-

evidently of major importance in the drafting and defense of the
Constitution.

It is also true that they were not the only

political philosopher with an impact on the times.

It has been

stated that Hamilton was very familiar with Hume and Hobbes,
sometimes even labeled "the American Hobbes," 41 but Burns explains

Arthur o. Lovejoy, Reflections on Human Nature,
Johns Hopkins Press, 1961), 46.
39

(Baltimore:

40

John Patrick Diggins, "Theory and the American Founding,"
in Leslie Berlowitz, Denis Donoghue, Louis Menard eds., America
in Theory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 4.
41

Throughout his life it is apparent that Hamilton viewed the
British political system favorably, and Hobbes' Leviathan is and
was considered by many to be an apology of that system.
Nevertheless, Rossiter rejects this label: " ... and Hamilton was
not a Hobbes any more than Jefferson was a Locke ... America has
never produced a man who could be assigned without hesitation to
the company of famous political theorists." From Rossiter, 183.

21

the situation well: "American legal theory in colonial times
represented and accumulation of ideas that ran all the way back to
Cicero and the Stoics and included the contributions of the
medievalists, of Bracton, of Coke, and most of all, of Locke"a
Credit is certainly due the writers and defenders of our
Constitution.

Madison, Hamilton, and others deserve their honored

place in history, but credit must also be given to the ideas of
John Locke and Charles Louis Montesquieu.

Though not American,

their ideas were as important and influential as any of the
founders.

aBurns, 175.

Bibliography
Allan, R.S. ed. Liberty and Learning.
Tombs Ltd., 1950.

Christchurch: Whitcombe and

Ashcraft, Richard. Locke's Two Treatises of Government.
and Unwin, 1987.
Beard, Charles ed. The Enduring Federalist.
and Company, 1948.

London: Allen

Garden City, NY: Doubleday

Beck, James M. The Constitution of the United States.
George H. Doran Company, 1922.
Berlowitz, Leslie, Denis Donoghue, and Louis Menard eds.
Theory. New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
Berns, Walter.
"Locke and the Legislative Principle.''
Interest 100 (Summer 1990): 147-157.

New York:
America in
The Public

Boyd, Julian P. ed. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Vols. I & XVI.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1950.
Burns, Edward McNall. James Madison. Philosopher of the Constitution.
New York: Octagon Books Inc., 1968.
Cooke, Jacob E. The Federalist.
Press, 1961.

Middletown, CN: Wesleyan University

Eidelberg, Paul. The Philosophy of the American Constitution.
York: The Free Press, 1968.
Gough, J.W. John Locke's Political Philosophy.
Press, 1956.

New

Oxford: The Clarendon

Howard, A.E. Dick.
"James Madison and the Constitution.
Quarterly 9 (Summer 1985): 80-91.

Wilson

Jones, Llewellyn ed. Gems of the World's Best Classics Vol. V.
Chicago: The Geographical Publishing Company, 1927.
Locke, John. On Politics and Education with introduction by Howard R.
Penniman. Roslyn, NY: Walter J. Black, Inc., 1947.
Locke, John. Two Treatises of Government with introduction by Peter
Laslett. Cambridge: The University Press, 1960.
Lovejoy, Arthur O. Reflections of Human Nature.
Hopkins Press, 1961.

22

Baltimore: The Johns

23
Mattern, David et al eds. The Papers of James Madison.
Charlottesville: Univerisity Press of Virginia, 1991.
Monaghan, Frank.

John Jay.

New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1935.

Montesquieu, Charles Louis de Secondat. The Spirit of Laws.
University of California Press, 1977.
Pangle, Thomas L. The Spirit of Modern Republicanism.
University of Chicago Press, 1988.

Chicago:

Rossiter, Clinton. Alexander Hamilton and the Constitution.
Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1964.
Rossiter, Clinton.
Co. , 1966.

1787, The Grand Convention.

Rousseau, Jean Jacque.

Berkeley:

New York:

New York: The MacMillan

The Social Contract.

Syrett, Harold c. ed. The Papers of Alexander Hamilton Vol. I.
York: Columbia University Press, 1961.

New

Urofsky, Melvin I. ed. Documents of American Constitutional and Legal
History Vol. I. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989.

West, Thomas.
Politics

"Leo Strauss and the American Founding."
53 (Winter 1991}: 157-172.

The Review of

White, Morton. Philosophy, The Federalist, and the Constitution.
York: Oxford University Press, 1987.
Wilson, Fred Taylor. Our Constitution and Its Makers.
Fleming H. Revell Company, 1937.

New York:

New

